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Dislocation in Translation
Naoki Sakai
My task is to trace, with a dotted line so to say, a passage from 
the project I call “the dislocation of the West” to the general topic 
of translation. In stating “dislocation,” I am drawing attention 
to the two possible connotations of this word: the exiting or 
disconnecting of something from a fixed location, on the one 
hand, and the undoing of the act of geographic mapping by 
which something is located, that is, identified in terms of spatial 
coordinates on a cartographic plane, on the other. Although what 
we normally understand by translation may at first appear to 
have little to do with geography, the act of translation is often 
represented as a spatial bridging between locations, territories and 
places as if the initial discontinuity or difference that translation 
is to overcome had preliminarily been determined to be a 
geographic distance. There is no necessary relationship between 
the conception of translation and the cartographic determination 
of translation in its representation. Or to put it simply, how we 
conceive of translation is entirely independent of the invocation 
of the figures of geographic territory. Nonetheless, it is very 
difficult to evade this regime according to which translation is 
represented as a bridging of two separate entities, territories or 
what Thongchai Winichakul calls “geo-bodies” (1994). In the 
modern world, it is extremely difficult to think of translation 
outside this schema of co-figuration.
The conceptual complexity of the term “translation” 
and the difficulty in any attempt to define it make it necessary 
to historicize the particular ways in which translation has been 
understood and practiced in modern nation-states. To the extent 
that the politico-ethical significance of translation is always 
complicit with the construction, transformation or disruption 
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of power relations, translation participates in the dislocation of 
communication.1 Translation involves moral imperatives on the 
part of both the addresser and the addressee and can always be 
viewed, to a greater or lesser degree, as a political maneuver of 
social antagonism. In addition, the representation of translation 
produces socio-political effects and serves as a technology by 
which individuals imagine their relation to the national or ethnic 
community. In this respect, let us keep in mind, one is already 
committed to a certain metaphysics when one assumes, wittingly 
or not, that translation is representable and serves subjects or—
this will come to connote the same thing—serves to manufacture 
subjects. Therefore, my inquiry into translation is, first of all, 
1  Jean-Luc Nancy discusses “the ruin of theories of ‘communication.’” 
“It is a community in that Bataille immediately communicates to me the 
pain and the pleasure that result from the impossibility of communicating 
anything at all without touching the limit where all meaning [sens] spills 
out of itself, like a simple ink stain on a word, on the word ‘meaning’” 
(1993, p.  319). “This spilling and this ink are the ruin of theories of 
‘communication,’ of the conventional chatter that attempts to promote 
reasonable exchange and serves only to obscure violence, betrayal 
and lies, leaving no possibility of measuring oneself against powerful 
follies. But the reality of community, where nothing is shared without 
also being removed from this kind of ‘communication,’ has already, 
always, revealed the vanity of such discourses. They communicate 
only the postulation of the communication of a ‘meaning,’ and of the 
meaning of ‘communication’” (ibid., p. 320). What Nancy alludes to by 
“excription in communication” is how the community is communicated 
in exposition. The prefix “ex-” in “excription” and “exposition” points to 
the thematics of dislocation and “ex-tatic outside of itself.” It is precisely 
in relation to the problematics of the excriptic/expository materiality 
of being-in-common that I have tried to understand translation. “Les 
corps toujours sur le départ, dans l’imminence d’un mouvement, d’une 
chute, d’un écart, d’une dislocation.” “L’exposition ne signifie pas que 
l’intimité est extraite de son retranchement, et portée au-dehors, mise en 
vue. […] L’exposition signifie au contraire que l’expression est elle-même 
l’intimité et le retranchement. L’à part soi ne s’y traduit pas, ne s’y incarne 
pas, il y est ce qu’il est : ce vertigineux retranchement de soi qu’il faut 
pour ouvrir l’infini de retranchement jusqu’à soi. Le corps est ce départ 
de soi, à soi” (2000, pp. 31-32). The whole discussion of community and 
communication will take us back to Nancy’s earlier text on Georges 
Bataille (1983, pp. 11-49).
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concerned with a regime that postulates translation as something 
representable, and then, with the task of historicizing that regime.
The particular way translation was represented is 
conditioned by the essentially “modern” schema of co-figuration 
(most typically, the communication model according to which 
translation is represented as a transfer of signification between 
two clearly demarcated unities of ethnic or national languages) 
by means of which we comprehend natural language as an 
ethno-linguistic unity. In other words, the commonsensical 
notion of translation is delimited by the schematism of the world 
(by the act of representing the world according to the schema 
of co-figuration). Conversely, the modern image of the world 
as “inter-national” (that is, as consisting of basic units called 
nations) is prescribed by a representation of translation as a 
communicative and international transfer of a message between a 
pair of ethno-linguistic unities.
The Concept of Translation and Its Complexity 
The network of lexicographical connotations associated with the 
term translation leads to notions of transferring, conveying or 
moving from one place to another, or of linking one word, phrase 
or text to another. The words for translation in many modern 
languages share these connotations: fanyi in Chinese, translation 
in English, traduction in French, honyaku in Japanese, Übersetzung 
in German, and so forth. It may therefore appear justified to 
postulate the following definition: “Translation is a transfer of the 
message from one language to another.” Even before one specifies 
what sort of transfer this may be, it is hard to refrain from asking 
about the message. Is not the message in this definition a product 
or consequence of the transfer called translation, rather than 
an entity that precedes the action of transfer, something that 
remains invariant in the process of translation? Is the message, 
which is supposedly transferred in this process, determinable in 
and of itself before it has been operated on? And what is the 
status of the language from which or into which the message is 
transferred? Is it justifiable to assume that the source language 
in which the original text makes sense is different and distinct 
from the target language into which the translator renders the 
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text as faithfully as possible? Are these languages countable? 
In other words, is it possible to isolate and juxtapose them as 
individual units, like apples, for example, and unlike water? By 
what measure is it possible to distinguish one from the other and 
endow it with a unity or body? But for the sake of facilitating 
the representation of translation, is it not necessary to posit 
the organic unity of language rather than seeing it as a random 
assemblage of words, phrases and utterances if one is to speak of 
translation in accordance with the definition?
Accordingly, the presumed invariance of the message 
transmitted through translation is confirmed only retroactively, 
after it has been translated. What kind of definition is it, then, 
that includes the term in need of explanation in the definition 
itself ? Is it not a circular definition? Similarly, the unity both of 
the source and the target language is also a supposition in whose 
absence the definition would make little sense. What might 
translation be if we suppose that a language is not countable or 
that one language cannot be easily distinguished from another?
It is difficult to evade this problem when we attempt 
to comprehend the terms “meaning” and “language.” At the 
very least, we can say that, in our transcendental investigation, 
translation is not derivative or secondary to meaning or language; 
it is just as fundamental or foundational in any attempt to 
elucidate these concepts. Translation indicates the trace of contact 
with the incomprehensible, the unknowable, or the unfamiliar, 
that is, with the foreign, and there is no awareness of language 
or meaning until we come across the foreign. First and foremost, 
the problematic of translation is concerned with the allocation of 
the foreign.
If the foreign is unambiguously inconceivable, 
unknowable and unfamiliar beyond comprehension, then 
translation simply cannot be done. If, conversely, the foreign is 
understandable, knowable and familiar, translation is unnecessary. 
Thus, the status of the foreign is ambiguous and devious in 
translation. The foreign is incomprehensible and comprehensible, 
unknowable and knowable, unfamiliar and familiar alternatively 
and at the same time. This foundational ambiguity of translation 
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is derived from the positionality occupied by the translator. The 
translator is summoned only when two kinds of audiences are 
postulated with regard to the source text, one for whom the 
text is comprehensible at least to some degree, and the other for 
whom it is incomprehensible. The translator’s work consists in 
dealing with difference between the two audiences. The translator 
encroaches on both and stands in the midst of this difference. 
In other words, for the first audience the source “language” is 
comprehensible while for the second it is incomprehensible. It is 
important to note that the language in this instance is figurative: 
it need not refer to the “natural” language of an ethnic or national 
community, German or Tagalog, for example. It is equally 
possible to have two kinds of audiences when the source text is a 
technical document or an avant-garde work of art. In such cases 
“language” may well refer to a vocabulary or set of expressions 
associated with a professional field or discipline, for example, 
jurisprudence; it may imply a style of graphic inscription or an 
unusual perceptual setting in which an artwork is displayed. This 
loose use of the term “language” invariably renders the task of 
determining the meaning of the term translation difficult, for 
all the acts of projecting, exchanging, linking, matching and 
mapping could then be talked about as sorts of translation, even if 
not a single word or verbal act is involved. Here the discernibility 
of the linguistic and the non-linguistic is at stake.
Roman Jakobson’s famous taxonomy of translation 
attempts to restrict the instability inherent in the figurative 
use of the word “language.” Jakobson divides translation into 
three classes: “(1)  Intralingual translation or rewording is an 
interpretation of verbal signs by means of other signs of the same 
language. (2)  Interlingual translation or translation proper is an 
interpretation of verbal signs by means of some other language. 
(3) Intersemiotic translation or transmutation is an interpretation 
of verbal signs by means of nonverbal sign systems” ( Jakobson, 
1971, p. 266). According to the Jakobsonian taxonomy, one 
who translates “legal language” into common parlance would 
be performing an intralingual translation, while one who offers 
a commentary on an obscure artwork would be engaged in an 
intersemiotic translation. In neither case can one be said to be a 
translator strictly speaking. Only someone who translates a text 
from one language to another would be doing translation proper.
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Jakobson’s taxonomy neither elucidates nor responds 
to our query about the supposition concerning the countability 
and organic unity of the source and target languages. It does 
not empirically validate the supposition concerning the 
ethno-linguistic unity of natural language; it merely repeats and 
reconfirms it. Nevertheless, it discloses that “translation proper” 
depends on a supposed discernibility between the interlingual 
and the intralingual, between a translation from one language to 
another and a rewording within the same language. It thereby 
prescribes and demarcates the locus of difference between two 
presumably ethnic or national language communities by virtue 
of the fact that Jakobson presupposes that translation proper 
can take place only between two unequivocally circumscribed 
languages. It therefore eradicates the various differences and 
potential dislocation within such a linguistic community and 
configures the foreign exclusively outside the unity of a language.
No doubt this conception of translation is a 
schematization of the globally shared and abstractly idealized 
commonsensical vision of the international world, consisting 
of basic units—i.e., nations—segmented by national borders 
into territories. It is not simply Jakobson’s idiosyncratic view. In 
this schematization, “translation proper” not only claims to be a 
description or representation of what happens in the process of 
translation; this description also prescribes and directs how to 
represent and apprehend what one accomplishes “perlocutionarily” 
when one translates. In this respect, “translation proper” is a 
discursive construct: it is part of what may be called the regime 
of translation, an institutionalized assemblage of protocols, 
rules of conduct, canons of accuracy and ways of viewing. The 
discursive regime of translation is poietic, or productive, in that it 
foregrounds what speech acts theorists called the “perlocutionary” 
effect (Austin, 1967). Just as a perlocutionary act of persuading 
might well happen in a speech act of arguing but persuasion does 
not always result from argument, “translation proper” need not 
be postulated whenever one acts to translate. Yet, in the regime 
of translation, it is as if there were a causal relationship between 
the co-figurative schematization of translation and the process 
of translation. Collapsing the process of translation onto its 
co-figurative schematization, the representation of translation 
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repeatedly discerns the domestic language co-figuratively—one 
unity is figured out, represented and comprehended as a spatial 
figure in contrast to another—as if the two unities were already 
present in actuality. It is in this sense that Jakobson is committed 
to that metaphysics thanks to which the regime of translation 
appears to found the propriety of “translation proper” and to 
validate the ethno-linguistic unity of “natural” language.
As long as one remains captive to the conventional 
regime of translation, one construes the ambiguity inherent in 
the translator’s positionality only as the dual position a translator 
occupies between a native language and a foreign tongue. Hence 
the presumption persists that one either speaks one’s mother 
tongue or a foreigner’s. The translator’s task would be to discern 
the differences between the two languages. And this difference is 
always determined as that between two linguistic communities. 
Despite countless potential differences within one linguistic 
community, the regime of translation obliges one to speak from 
within a binary opposition, either to the same or to the other. 
Thus, in the regime of translation the translator becomes invisible 
(Venuti, 1995, pp. 1-42) because the translator is the one who 
eludes identification within the binary. This attitude, in which 
one is constantly solicited to identify oneself within the binary, 
may be called “monolingual address” (Sakai, 1997, pp. 1-17) 
whereby the addresser adopts the position representative of a 
putatively homogeneous language community, and enunciates 
to addressees who are also representative of a homogeneous 
language community. The term monolingual address, however, does 
not imply a social situation in which both the addresser and the 
addressee in a conversation share the same language or are native 
to the same ethno-linguistic unity; they believe they belong to 
different languages yet can still address each other monolingually.
Translator: The Subject in Transit
Is it possible to understand the act of translation outside the 
monolingual address? To respond to this question, it may be 
helpful to consider the translator’s position of address. When 
engaged in the task of translation, can she perform a speech act 
such as making a promise? Is the translator responsible for what 
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she says while translating? Due to the translator’s unavoidably 
ambiguous position, the answer too is ambiguous. Yes, she can 
make a promise, but only on behalf of someone else. She “herself ” 
cannot make a promise. The translator is responsible for her 
translation but she cannot be held responsible for the pledges 
expressed in it because she is not allowed to say what she means; 
she is required to say what she says without meaning it. In essence, 
the translator is someone who cannot say “I.” Here the problem 
of the invariant message returns as the question of meaning, of 
what the translator “means” to say.
In relation to the source text, the translator seems to 
occupy the position of the addressee. She listens or reads what 
the original addresser enunciates. At the same time, however, 
there is no supposition that the addresser is speaking or writing 
to her. The addressee of the enunciation is not located where 
the translator is; in translation, the addressee is always located 
elsewhere. Here again the translator’s positionality is inherently 
ambiguous: she is both an addressee and not an addressee. She 
cannot be the “you” to whom the addresser refers.
A similar disjunction can be observed in the enunciation 
of the target text, that is, in the translation. In relation to the 
audience of the target text, the translator seems to occupy the 
position of the addresser. The translator speaks or writes to the 
audience. But it is seemingly not the translator herself who 
speaks or writes to the addressee. The I uttered by the translator 
does not designate the translator herself but rather the subject of 
the original enunciation. And if the translator does indicate the 
subject of the translated enunciation by saying I, in a “translator’s 
note,” for example, she will then have to designate the original 
addresser as he or she. 
In other words, in translation, the subject of the 
enunciation and the subject of the enunciated—the speaking 
I and the I that is signified—are not expected to coincide. The 
translator’s desire is at least displaced, if not entirely dissipated, in 
the translated enunciation, if by desire we understand that what 
is signified by I in “my” utterance ought to be sutured with the 
supposedly concrete and unique—but imagined—existence of 
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“me” (the desire expressed as “I want to be myself ”). This is why 
the translator cannot be designated straightforwardly either as I 
or you: she disrupts the attempt to appropriate the relation of the 
addresser and addressee as a personal relation between the first 
person and the second person. According to Émile Benveniste, 
only those directly addressing and those directly addressed can be 
called persons, whereas he, she, and they cannot be so designated 
(Benveniste, 1971, p. 224). Hence, the addresser, the translator and 
the addressee cannot be persons simultaneously. The dislocation 
of the paradigmatic relations of personal positions constantly 
occurs in translation. The translator cannot be the first or second 
person, or even the third “person” undisruptively. Ineluctably, 
translation introduces an instability into the putatively personal 
relations among the agents of speech, writing, listening and 
reading. The translator is internally split and multiple, devoid of a 
stable position. At best, she is a subject in transit.
In the first place, this is because the translator cannot be 
an “individual” in the sense of individuum, the indivisible unit. In 
the second, it is because she is a singularity that marks an elusive 
point of discontinuity in the social even though translation is the 
practice of creating continuity from discontinuity. She is assigned 
to the place of the foreign, in the smooth space of partage where 
the foreign is an opening on the articulation of the conceivable 
and the incomprehensible. Translation is a poietic social practice 
that institutes a relation at the site of incommensurability. 
This is why the discontinuity inherent in translation would be 
completely repressed if we were to determine translation as the 
communication of information; the ambiguity inherent in the 
translator’s positionality would have to be entirely overlooked 
as long as translation is grasped as the transfer of an invariant 
message from one language to another.
The internal split within the translator demonstrates 
how the subject constitutes itself. In a sense, this internal 
split is homologous to what is known as the “fractured I.” The 
temporality of “I speak” necessarily introduces an irreparable 
distance between the speaking I and the I signified, between the 
subject of the enunciation and the subject of the enunciated. The 
subject in the sense that I am here and now speaking designates 
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the subject of the enunciation, but it does not signify it because 
every signifier of the subject of the enunciation may be lacking 
in the enunciated or the statement (Lacan, 1977, p. 298). In the 
case of translation, however, an ambiguity in the translator’s 
positionality marks the instability of the we as subject rather 
than that of the I, since the translator cannot be a unified and 
coherent personality in translation. This suggests the possibility 
of a different attitude of address, namely, “heterolingual address” 
(Sakai, 1997, pp. i-xii), a situation in which one addresses oneself 
as a foreigner to another foreigner. Held captive in the regime of 
translation, however, the translator is supposed to assume the role 
of the transcendent arbitrator, not only between the addresser 
and the addressee but also between their linguistic communities. 
As monolingual address, translation, as a process of creating 
continuity in discontinuity, is often replaced by the representation 
of translation in which translation is schematized according to 
the co-figurative communication model.
Modernity and the Schema of Co-Figuration: A Genealogy of 
the Modern
Let us consider how translation is displaced by its representation 
and how collective subjectivity, such as national and ethnic 
subjectivity, is constituted in the representation of translation. 
Through the translator’s labor, the incommensurable differences 
that call for the translator’s service in the first place are negotiated. 
In other words, the work of translation is a practice by which 
the initial discontinuity between the addresser and the addressee 
is made continuous. In this respect translation is like other 
social practices: translation makes something comprehensible 
out of an unrepresentable difference. Therefore, translation 
cannot be construed in terms of representable difference. Only 
retrospectively can we recognize the initial incommensurability 
as a gap, crevice or border between fully constituted entities, 
spheres or domains. Cultural difference, which prompts 
translation, is unrepresentable in this sense and can by no means 
be reduced to either specific difference or spatial distance. But 
when represented as a conceptual difference or gap, it is no longer 
an incommensurability. It is mapped onto a striated space, which 
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may be segmented by national borders and other markers of 
collective (national, ethnic, racial or “cultural”) identification. 
Incommensurable difference is more like a feeling2 prior 
to the explanation of how incommensurability has occurred, and 
cannot be represented as a specific difference (in the economy 
of genera and species, for example) between two terms or entities. 
What makes it possible to represent the initial difference as an 
already determined one between one language unity and another 
is the work of translation itself. Hence the untranslatable, or 
what appears to resist translation, cannot exist prior to the 
enunciation of translation. It is translation that gives birth to the 
untranslatable. The untranslatable is not anterior to translation. 
Neither is it immanent in the invariant message that is supposedly 
transferred in translation. But the untranslatable pertains to the 
dislocation of communication; it is as much a testimony to the 
sociality of the translator, whose elusive positionality reveals the 
presence of an aggregate community of foreigners between the 
addresser and the addressee, as the translatable itself is. We fail 
to communicate because we are in common with one another. 
Community does not mean we share common ground. On the 
contrary, we are in community precisely because we are exposed 
to a forum where our differences and failure in communication 
are manifest. Nevertheless, the translator’s essential sociality 
with respect to the untranslatable is disregarded in monolingual 
address, and with the repression of this insight, monolingual 
address equates translation with the representation of translation.
When the temporality of translation by which the 
translator’s disjunctive positionality manifests itself is erased, 
translation is displaced by the representation of translation. 
Because the disruptive and dynamic processes of translation 
are ironed out, the representation of translation allows for the 
representation of ethnic or national subjects as two contrasting 
spots in the co-figurative representation and, despite the presence 
of the translator, who is always ambiguous and disjunctive, 
2  For a more detailed discussion about the “feeling” and difference, see: 
Gilles Deleuze, Chapter 4, 1994. And for the poetic aspect of “feeling,” 
p. 291 ff.
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translation as representation thus posits one language unity against 
another, and one “cultural” unity against another. In this regard, 
the representation of translation transforms difference in repetition 
(Deleuze, 1994, pp. 70-128) into a specific difference between 
two particularities and serves to constitute the putative unities 
of national languages, thereby reinscribing the initial difference 
and incommensurability as a specific, or commensurate and 
conceptual difference between two particular languages within 
the continuity of languages. As a result of this displacement, 
translation is represented as a form of communication between 
two fully circumscribed, different but comparable language 
communities in which social antagonism and the various loci of 
difference are expunged.
The particular representation of translation as 
communication between two particular languages is no doubt 
a historical construct. Given the politico-social significance 
of translation, it is no accident that, historically, the regime of 
translation became widely accepted in many regions of the 
world after the feudal order and its passive vassal subject gave 
way to the disciplinary order of the active citizen-subject in 
the modern nation-state, to an order consisting of disciplinary 
regiments which Michel Foucault describes brilliantly. The 
regime of translation serves to reify national sovereignty. As 
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri have argued, it makes “the 
relation of sovereignty into a thing (often by naturalizing it) and 
thus weeds out every residue of social antagonism. The nation is 
a kind of ideological shortcut that attempts to free the concepts 
of sovereignty and modernity from the antagonism and crisis that 
define them” (Hardt and Negri, 2000, p. 95).
Following the Kantian schematism,3 the poietic 
technology embedded in the regime of translation which 
renders it representable may be called “the schema of co-
3  Kant thought of the schema as a “third thing” heterogeneous to 
either sensibility or understanding, thanks to which an intuition—in 
sensibility—is subsumed under a concept—in understanding—and 
attributed it to the general faculty of imagination, a faculty whereby 
to give a concept its figure or Bild. He called the operation of schema 
“schematism” (1933, pp.180–89).
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figuration.” Since the practice of translation remains radically 
heterogeneous to the representation of translation, translation 
cannot be represented as a communication between two clearly 
delineated ethno-linguistic unities. Rather, it was this particular 
representation of translation that gave rise to the possibility of 
figuring out the unity of ethnic or national language together with 
another language unity. Thanks to this co-figurative schematism, 
there emerges an ethno-linguistic unity as if it were a sensuous 
and unified thing hidden and dormant behind the surface of 
extensive variety. In other words, the schema of co-figuration is a 
technology by means of which an ethno-linguistic community is 
rendered representable as a “geo-body,” thereby constituting itself 
as a substratum upon which national sovereignty can be built. 
“People” is nothing but an idealization of this substratum.
This self-constitution of the nation does not proceed 
unitarily; on the contrary, its figure constitutes itself only by 
making visible the figure of an other with which it engages in 
a relationship of translation. Precisely because the two nations 
are represented as equivalent and alike, however, it is possible 
to determine them as conceptually different, and their difference 
is construed as a specific difference (daiphora) between separate 
identities. Nevertheless, cultural difference, which calls for 
the work of a translator, is not a conceptual difference but an 
incommensurability, that is, the very absence of a common 
denominator for conceptual comparison. The relationship of the 
two terms as equivalent and alike in specific difference gives rise 
to the possibility of extracting an infinite number of distinctions 
between the two. Just as in the co-figuration of “the West and 
the Rest” by which “the West” represents itself, constituting itself 
by positing everything else as “the Rest,” conceptual difference 
allows one term to be evaluated as superior to the other. This 
co-figurative comparison allows for typical binary oppositions 
to characterize the West and the Rest, such as: the presence of 
scientific rationality versus its absence, the future-oriented spirit 
of progress versus the tradition-bound sense of social obligation, 
the internalization of religious faith and its accompanying 
secularism versus the inseparableness of the private and the 
public.
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The “modern” is marked by the introduction of the 
schema of co-figuration, without which it is difficult to imagine 
a nation or ethnicity as a homogeneous sphere. As Antoine 
Berman taught us on the intellectual history of translation and 
Romanticism in Germany, the economy of the foreign, that 
is, how the foreign must be allocated in the production of the 
domestic language, has played a decisive role in the poietic—and 
poetic—identification of national language.4 Most conspicuously 
in eighteenth-century movements such as Romanticism in 
Western Europe and Kokugaku (National Studies) in Japan, 
intellectual and literary maneuvers to invent, mythically and 
poetically, a national language were closely associated with a 
spiritual construction of a new identity which later naturalized 
national sovereignty. This substratum for the legitimation of 
national and popular sovereignty was put forward as a “natural” 
language specific to the “people,” supposedly spoken by them 
in their everyday lives. Literary historians generally call this 
historical development “the emergence of the vernacular.” With 
the irruption of the sphere of nearness-extensive obsessions with 
things of everydayness and experiential immediacy—in which the 
ordinary and the colloquial were celebrated (Sakai, 1991, pp. 113-
240), the status of “universal” languages such as Latin, literary 
Chinese, and Sanskrit was drastically and decisively altered. In 
their place, languages emerged whose markers were ethnic and 
national—English, German, Japanese, Thai and so forth—and 
the ancient canons were translated into these languages. For this 
reason, Martin Luther’s German translation of the Bible and 
Motoori’s Japanese phonetic translation of the Kojiki (Records of 
Ancient Matters) can be said to mark crucial steps in modernity. 
This emphasis on ordinary and colloquial languages paralleled 
the reconception of translation and the schema of co-figuration.
In talking about “modern” as it is apprehended in many 
parts of the world today, first it is historically necessary to anchor 
it in the original uses of this notion in the history of Western 
Europe. This is neither because the most authentic forms of 
modernity are found in Western Europe, nor because modernity 
4  For an extensive analysis of the role of the foreign in German 
Romanticism, see: Antoine Berman, 1992.
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emanated from the center somewhat associated with Western 
Europe to the periphery of the Rest. Rather this is because the 
notion of “modern” has been accepted and used primarily as a 
translation from its European originals for more than a century 
in many places, including those outside the geographic terrain of 
Europe and North America. One can talk about “modern” as if 
there were a globally common apprehension of it precisely because, 
all over the world, people assume it is impossible to apprehend it 
without referring it back to its European equivalents, from which 
their local translations are believed to have derived. In the globally 
accepted conception of modernity the schema of co-figuration 
between the West and the Rest is already powerfully at work. 
Therefore, despite linguistic and social diversities among the 
different sites of the world, the notion of “modern” is supposedly 
retraceable to the singular history of Western Europe thanks to 
the Eurocentric structure incorporated in the very notion itself. 
In this respect, the schema of co-figuration is the form which is 
most appropriate to the representation of the Eurocentric world, 
and it is also a form in which the legacy of European colonialisms 
is preserved. As far as the local terms used for modernity are 
concerned, however, the situation was drastically different in 
“pre-modern” times preceding the translation of “modern” into 
local equivalents.
It is often presumed that genealogically the word “modern” 
of modern English derives from the Latin adverb modo meaning 
“lately” or “just now.” It meant the array of recent events close to 
the present moment, or the recent times in contrast to the distant 
past, along a chronological axis. In the pre-modern periods, many 
of the terms and expressions which are used to connote “modern” 
today in places and communities outside Western Europe meant 
something like the Latin modo, and did not imply any necessary 
reference to Western Europe. In the cosmological universes of 
those peoples inhabiting many regions of the globe, Western 
Europe did not carry such universal prestige, and “the West” 
simply did not exist, for “the West” is nothing but this prestige in 
global relationality.
The introduction of “modern” qualitatively changed the 
manner in which people customarily organized their historical 
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experience. With the arrival of “modern,” people in many places 
in the world began to map geopolitical directives, centered 
around colonial powers in Western Europe, onto their pasts 
and futures, and to order their destinies and desires in terms 
of cartographic relativity. “Modern” now implied much more 
than a chronological closeness to the present moment in which 
periods are classified. Consequently, they sought coherence in 
the transition from the experience of their past to the anxiety 
or hope for their future by projecting a trajectory from a topos 
outside the modern onto a topos within. The progression of time 
from the past to the future was thus associated with a movement 
on the cartographically imagined surface of the globe, from a 
geographic location outside the “modern” civilization to another 
within it. The dynamic ecstatic or ex-static process from the past 
to the future was deprived of its temporality, and represented 
spatially as a vector from a geopolitical location in the periphery 
to another in the center. Thus, the temporal movement could be 
appropriated by the schema of co-figuration, and consequently 
the two pairing figures of the West and the Rest were imagined 
as if each were somewhat homogeneous within, despite the fact 
that neither the West nor the Rest could be an entity or a unity of 
language. Indeed, this explains how the mythic construct called 
“the West” was constituted, and why the West had been perceived 
as structurally indissociable from the modern until recently. 
Hence, it is important to differentiate two dimensions in which 
the schema of co-figuration operates. In the case of the West 
and the Rest binary, it is always the one-and-many opposition, 
and the West remains the point of reference in all comparisons 
whereas the Rest is variable. Therefore, the West is often imagined 
to be an enduring identity such as the continuing tradition of 
Christianity, the foundational structure of medieval legal and 
theocratic order, and the archaic Greek rationality while the Rest 
is simply an accidental assemblage of diverse life forms and does 
not constitute a single substance. This means that the centrality 
of the West consists of the polarity of the distribution of ethnic, 
civilizational and racial comparisons. (Let me note in passing 
here that whiteness in racial hierarchy clearly has a structural 
affinity with this centrality of the West. Perhaps this explains why 
the white and the Westerner are so frequently confused with each 
other although whiteness and the West are clearly of different 
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registers.) On the other hand, in the case of the co-figurative 
identification of the ethno-linguistic unity, it is the postulate of 
specific difference between two languages in translation. To the 
extent that the ethno-linguistic unity could be thought of without 
reference to the polarity in the distribution of comparisons, the 
international world does not and should not have a dominant 
center, and this idealized international world consisting of equal 
national sovereignties is expressed in the design of the United 
Nations. But, of course, these two dimensions in the operation of 
the schema of co-figuration are intimately related to one another 
in the allocation of civilizational differences, and their correlation 
is one of the fundamental features of the modern international 
world.
The very split between the two distinct dimensions of 
co-figurative modernity—the modernity of the ethno-linguistic 
unity and the colonial modernity of the West and the Rest—is 
itself the very definition of something like Modernity in general 
in the constitution of the hierarchical, non-democratic world 
of Capital. Even in their very opposition, both ethno-linguistic 
modernity and Eurocentric modernity are bound to a common 
index: the normative value of the West, the putative naturalness 
of which obfuscates a state of domination. This is accomplished 
by the form of an exception. Indeed, the dialectical subject of 
history excepts itself from history (without taking exception to 
history), thereby eliding the continual presence of third-term 
“exteriorities” (supplements, exclusions and displacements).5 
Historically, how we represent translation prescribes 
not only how we collectively imagine national communities and 
ethnic identities but also how we relate individually to national 
sovereignty. Translation is also complicit in the discourse of the 
West and the Rest through which colonial power relationships 
are continually fantasized and reproduced, and the hierarchical 
order of the modern world is rejuvenated. 
5  Carl Schmitt advances this argument in The Nomos of the Earth 
(2003). See Part III: The Jus Publicum Europæum. Of course, he viewed 
it from the Eurocentric perspective.
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This has been a rather hasty examination of the problems 
of translation as they relate to my project “the dislocation of the 
West.” I hope that you can see that “the dislocation of the West” 
has nothing to do with the typical rhetoric of “the decline of 
the West;” neither has it much in common with “provincializing 
Europe,” for I would never regard the West as an enclosed 
territory or as the enduring consistency of a tradition. Since it 
is no more than an allocation of civilizational differences, it is 
not an entity that can decline or grow. By rigorously examining 
the schematism of co-figuration, I believe that we should be 
able to comprehend how the West is cartographically mapped 
and rendered localizable despite its inherent inconsistency, and 
what violence is required to prevent it from being dislocated. In 
other words, the project of “the dislocation of the West” aspires to 
show that the West is being dislocated all the time. In this sense, 
translation is a process of global politics. 
Cornell University
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ABSTRACT: Dislocation in Translation — My inquiry into 
translation is, first of all, concerned with a regime that postulates 
translation as something representable, and then, with the task 
of historicizing that regime. The definition of translation as the 
“transfer of the message from one language into another” leads to 
the supposition that languages are separate and discrete unities. 
But what might translation be if we suppose that this is not the 
case and that one language cannot be easily distinguished from 
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another? The Jakobsonian concept of interlingual translation 
or “translation proper” fails to take into account the ambiguity 
inherent in the translator’s position: who and where is the 
translator in relation to the source and target texts? Being neither 
addresser nor addressee the translator becomes a “subject in 
transit.” If translation is understood as simply the transfer of an 
invariant message from one language to another, the ambiguity 
of the translator’s positionality is suppressed and with it the idea 
of translation as a poietic social practice that institutes a relation 
at the site of incommensurability. When this occurs, translation 
is replaced by the “representation of translation” and comes to be 
seen as a form of communication between two fully circumscribed 
language communities. It was this particular representation of 
translation which gave rise to the possibility of identifying the 
unity of ethnic or national language with another language unity. 
By this “schema of co-figuration” an ethnic-linguistic community 
becomes a “geo-body” on which national sovereignty is built. 
Two nations represented as equivalent and alike can be viewed as 
conceptually different, a difference construed as a specific difference. 
The co-figuration of “the West and the Rest” is an example of 
the resultant typical binary oppositions: “the West” constitutes 
itself by positing everything else as “the Rest” allowing one 
term to be evaluated as superior to the other. The identification 
of “modern” with “the West” changed how people organized 
historical experience; movement in time came to be associated 
with movement from periphery to centre. Historically, how 
we represent translation prescribes how we imagine national 
communities and ethnic identities.
RÉSUMÉ : La dislocation en traduction — Cet article explore 
le postulat qui définit la traduction comme représentable, puis 
se penche sur l’évolution de cette pensée. Définir la traduction 
comme «  le transfert d’un message d’une langue dans une 
autre » présuppose que les langues sont des unités individuelles 
et indépendantes. Mais que serait la traduction si on supposait 
le contraire, c’est-à-dire que les langues ne se distinguent pas si 
facilement les unes des autres? Le concept forgé par Jakobson 
de traduction interlinguistique ou « traduction propre » ne tient 
pas compte de l’ambiguïté inhérente à la place du traducteur  : 
qui est le traducteur et quelle est sa position par rapport au texte 
source et au texte cible? Ni destinateur ni destinataire, il devient 
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un «  sujet en transit  ». Si par l’acte de traduire on ne fait que 
transférer un message invariant d’une langue à une autre, on 
élimine à la fois l’ambiguïté de la position du traducteur ainsi 
que l’idée de la traduction comme pratique sociale poïétique 
qui établit une relation de l’ordre de l’incommensurabilité. 
La traduction est dès lors remplacée par une «  représentation 
de la traduction  » et est ainsi perçue comme une forme de 
communication entre les deux cercles fermés que forment 
chacune des communautés linguistiques. C’est précisément cette 
manière de représenter la traduction qui a permis d’identifier 
l’unicité d’une langue ethnique ou nationale à l’unicité d’une autre 
langue. Grâce à ce « schéma de co-figuration », une communauté 
ethnolinguistique devient un espace géographique sur lequel se 
construit la souveraineté nationale. Deux nations représentées 
comme des équivalents qui se ressemblent peuvent ainsi être 
considérées comme conceptuellement différentes, et leur différence 
est une différence spécifique. La co-figuration de l’expression « the 
West and the Rest » est un bon exemple d’une telle opposition 
binaire : « l’Ouest », ou l’Occident, se définit en se différenciant 
de ce qu’il n’est pas par «  le reste », ce qui met l’emphase sur la 
supériorité du premier terme par rapport au second. L’association 
du terme « moderne » avec « l’Ouest » a modifié le rapport des 
individus à l’histoire. Ainsi, le mouvement dans le temps est 
devenu synonyme de tout mouvement de la périphérie vers le 
centre. L’histoire démontre que notre manière de représenter la 
traduction dicte la manière dont on imagine les communautés 
nationales ainsi que les identités ethniques.
Keywords: dislocation, heterolingual address, modernity, 
monolingual address, nationalism
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